II. THE OPEN PATENTING PRACTICE
The many and various experiences that fall under the label of OI diverge significantly with regard to
what they "open". A few cases are enough to show how the realm of OI is articulated and compounded. For instance, whereas the Fightaids@home project "opens" computer capacity, in order to efficiently supply spare hardware to whoever is interested in experimenting and researching on the HIV virus, 5 the Innovation Portal is the tool whereby Procter&Gamble "opens" its doors to whoever is interested in submitting a patented innovation that matches the specific innovative needs that the company is expressly interested to satisfy. 6 In addition, whereas some projects -such as Association -see http://www.oshwa.org/ -that brings together inventors and designers who want to make their devices publicly available so that anyone can study, modify, distribute, make, and sell them and their improvements. Likewise, the Ohanda initiative -see http://www.ohanda.org/ -pools together, under the "Ohanda" label, inventors and designers that wants to release their innovations allowing third parties to: (i) use the invented device; (ii) access it and study its functioning; (iii) redistribute it; and (iv) modify, improve it and release the improvements to the public. In order to maintain the "Ohanda" label third parties must release the improvements at the same conditions, although there is no legal constraint that obliges them to do it. 6 See https://pgconnectdevelop.inovasuite.com/pg/ and, for the lists of the innovative needs that the company wants to satisfy, http://www.pg.com/connect_develop/pg_innovation/innovation_portal.shtml. Indeed, one of the first definitions of open innovation -a definition connected to the literature about knowledge management -pivoted around the idea that companies must look beyond their walls for new products and processes. these triggered the adoption of the CC licenses for copyrighted content. Subsequently, the need for a more flexible licensing tool has expanded also outside the copyright realm, and several patentees have become increasingly interested in subscribing to a diverse -more accommodating -private order whereby, through specific patent pledges and covenants, they could limit their traditional prerogatives in order to reduce the concerns and costs connected to the the trading and use of patents and to the developing of follow-on inventions.
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The reason why OP emerged is however multifold. To overcome the traditional ways in which innovation has been conceptualized and managed via IPRs is one of the most prominent justifications. In the wake of the OI movement, many OP projects adhere to the idea that innovation may also amount to a cumulative, bottom-up, demand-driven phenomenon of sharing and 
B. RECURRING PLEDGES AND COVENANTS IN THE OP PRACTICE
Analyzing many practical and theoretical OP licenses, we came across the following pledges and covenants. Some of them consist in stand-alone commitments that licensors (always patentees) freely undertake to limit their prerogatives. Others address the licensees (either patentees or "mere" patent users) of the pledged patents and belong to more complex arrangements whereby licensors limit their rights on condition that licensees will comply with some specific obligations that, in turn, limit patent users' freedom.
Non-assertion pledges (also said, non-challenging pledges) whereby patentees commit not to assert their patents. Often, the content of these pledges is descriptively delimited. For example, these pledges may be taken toward whom will pursue a pre-determined purpose or operate in a given industry to develop a certain technology. 27 The reasons why patentees adopt this kind of pledges are many, even outside the framework of SSOs working to guarantee interoperability. For , where we considered just the cases where patentees belonging to many industries have been using the same recurring pledges for both single patents and patent portfolios in an attempt to produce what in the copyright realm are the OSS or CC licenses. 27 For example, consider the non-assertion pledge of the Eco-Patent Commons stating that, «Patents included in the Commons shall be subject to a covenant, or pledge, not to assert the patent against implementers' environmentally beneficial use of the pledged patent(s). That is, subject to defensive actions described below, the patent holders shall not assert their pledged patents against an implementer's infringing machines, manufactures, processes, or compositions of matter that alone, or when in a larger product or service, achieve environmentally beneficial results.» (emphasis added).
example, non assertion pledges may serve to better the reputation of companies or to debunk the narrative of "Goliath-patentees" using their IPRs against "David-innovators". Yet, mainly, nonassertion pledges answer to the patent thicket problem due to the sheer number of patents granted every year by PTOs. These pledges, indeed, create a "safe environment" where individuals and companies are free to develop their innovative activities without worrying to be summoned as infringers of someone else's patent. No wonder, hence, that non-assertion pledges are the core of every OP license, because they remove one of the main obstacles that current overlapping and fragmented patents put to innovation, collaborative and cumulative one included.
Anti-transfer pledges whereby patentees promise not to transfer their patents to some companies that could use them as bargaining chips in sham litigations. 28 Also, these commitments have the purpose to displace one of the main obstacles that patentees find to trading their patents,
i.e. the fear that their patents will end up by being used to bully or troll other innovators.
Defensive termination clauses whereby patentees are freed from their commitments when patent users take some well-identified patent-related practices. For example, often patent users bringing offensive infringement action against patentees lose their status of licensees. 29 In other words, these clauses are meant to introduce an element of reciprocity into the license, by conditioning the obligations undertaken by patentees to the occurrence of equal "innovationfriendly" behaviors from the part of the patent users. No wonder, thus, that this element of reciprocity represents the backbone of many OP projects.
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Royalty pledges among which there are the royalty-free clauses as well as clauses that contemplate diverse royalties according to the additional services provided to the patent users. To be sure, these clauses have to do with the spurring of innovation in two peculiar ways: first, because 28 This can be inferred, for example, from the reading of the preamble of the DPL where it is stated that, «[t]he DPL legally binds patent owners to supporting access and freedom within the DPL community and thus provides assurances that patenting a given innovation will not be abused or misused within the DPL community». Yet, it is true that patent users are the only ones who are expressly forbidden to transfer the DPL patents to trolls. Indeed, clause 2(e) states that, «[l]icensor reserves the right to revoke and/or terminate this License with respect to a particular Licensee if ... ii.
[l]icensee assigns, transfers, or grants an exclusive license for a Patent to an entity or individual other than a DPL User without conditioning the assignment, transfer, or exclusive license on the recipient continuing to abide by the terms of this License, including but not limited to the revocation and termination rights under this Section.» See, http://www.defensivepatentlicense.org/ (last visited on May 26, 2015). 29 Consider, for example, that a patentee involved in the Defensive Patent License can void ab initio her non-assertion pledge in respect to a party when «i. Licensee makes any Infringement Claim, not including Defensive Patent Claims, against a DPL User; orii. Licensee assigns, transfers, or grants an exclusive license for a Patent to an entity or individual other than a DPL User without conditioning the assignment, transfer, or exclusive license on the recipient continuing to abide by the terms of this License, including but not limited to the revocation and termination rights under this Section.» 30 For example, the Defensive Patent License envisages that the patentees' commitments to offer any of their patents holds true towards anyone who makes a similar commitment.
they make the "working upon someone else' innovations" be cheaper 31 and, second, because they increase the potential commercial uses of the pledged patents.
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Discontinuation clauses that govern the cases where patentees take a step back and set themselves free from their previous commitments. The main goal of these clauses is to guarantee that the "opened" patents remain available to those who were licensees at the time of the withdrawal. In other words, in the great majority of OP experiences the OP licenses will remain in force, but the withdrawn patentees will regain the power to exercise its traditional prerogatives concerning her own inventions.
Grant-back covenants whereby patent users commit to grant back to the patentees any improvement and follow-on invention resulting from the use of the patent. 33 These clauses, coming within some licensing schemes creating online patent pools, pursue two main goals. First, they serve to guarantee a sort of fairness, by preventing the patent users to close up the pledged patents by including them into patentable improvements or follow on inventions. Second, these commitments are meant to keep into the pool whatever "good result" comes out from the employment of the patents put in commons. In other words, these clauses try to increase the attractiveness of the pool or, at least, not to deplete its value by moving out of it the improvements resulting from the shared technologies.
Viral covenants whereby patent users are forced to subject their improvements or follow-on innovations to be conducted in the same manner in which the release patent was treated. 34 Hence, also these clauses introduce an element of fairness in the relationship between patentees and patent users by preventing the latter from closing the open innovations up into subsequent patentable inventions. In addition, these clauses contribute to reinforce the very same OP phenomenon, by spread along the same OP license employed to open the first technology released.
In the subsequent section, we describe how the combination of the mentioned pledges and covenants have shaped some famous OP experiencing, making each of them somehow different from the other. innovation by providing a legal tool that will guarantee freedom to operate, will limit the risk of patent trolls, will encourage the participation in the patent process, and will reduce litigation costs.
III. TO EACH OP EXPERIENCE ITS OWN LICENSE
In practical terms, the DPL 1.1 is already available for use on the website and can be freely adopted by any patentee that joins the DPL community by declaring, on any publicly available website, her commitment to offer any patent she holds or obtains under the DPL to anyone who makes a similar commitment ("Offering Announcement"). 40 When the patentee is contacted by another DPL user willing to accept the license to her patents, she will provide the user with the URL for the Recently, another online tool has been adopted and it already promises to become a successful online pool. In July 2013, in the wake of another proposal formulated by Hayes and Schulman, the License on Tranfer (LOT) Network was launched and it already contains nearly and benefits are distributed across its users, the MDPL seeks to engage big stakeholders by modifying some of the DPL's clauses that would be too risky for them (such as the irrevocable and perpetual nature of the DPL grant). In particular, given the network effects that such environments are likely to generate, the MDPL aims at having large and established companies involved to achieve enough scale to "cover" the whole industry or economic sector.105 The two schemes do not aim at fostering Open Innovation via the spreading of patented knowledge; rather, they support Open Innovation by assuming that the innovation-friendly environments that they create will grow thanks to their own economic profitability and the network effects that they will trigger. 39 http://www.defensivepatentlicense.org/ 40 In even more practical terms, the patentee is encouraged to email the "Offering Announcement URL" to the DPL Foundation at defensivepatent@gmail.com so that others can learn about it and contact her to accept her licenses. In addition to sending the link to her Offering Announcement, the patentee should also include her current contact information for licensing purposes and a list of her patents (including country of issue, patent no., and title). See, http://www.defensivepatentlicense.org/content/frequently-asked-questions#how-does-the-dpl-work.
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See Defensive Patent License v1.1, article 2(e), http://www.defensivepatentlicense.org/sites/g/files/g1216936/f/201412/DPL%201.1.pdf 300,000 patent assets, including over 50,000 US issued patents. 42 The LOT Network mitigates the risks of costly litigations and allows Network participants to focus on innovative products and services. Similarly to the above cases, the LOT Network pools together the patent portfolios of the participants that, indeed, grant portfolio wide licenses. However, differently from the other experiences, the LOT agreement provides that the each of the licenses concluded within the Network becomes effective only when the related patents are transferred to third parties. In other words, to have the patents transferred outside the pool is the "triggering event" that causes the LOT license to become effective. The main reason for this so far unusual mechanism is that of avoiding patent litigations that occur whenever patent assertion entities acquire patents to seek financial gains by enforcing them against others. As to the withdrawal mechanism, it becomes effective if during the participation period the withdrawing participant held at least 10 U.S. patents, or triggered a license to at least one of its own patents. The withdrawing LOT Network participant keeps any license and released patents that triggered while it was a participant, while she will not receive the benefit of any triggered license which occurs after withdrawal. In other words, patents owned by the withdrawing LOT Network participant at the time of withdrawal remain subject to the obligations in the LOT Agreement and will still trigger the license even if they are transferred after the withdrawal, however the license will be only effective for active LOT Network participants at the time of the withdrawal. The LOT license also provides the Network users with a defensive termination clause stating that, when a Network participant asserts an offensive patent proceeding against a non-assertion entity to which a triggered patent has been transferred, she loses all the benefits coming from being part of the the LOT Network.
In sum, hence, the DPL and LOT serve to create organized structures that make possible for patentees to open up their patents within "safe environments" that can coexist with the outside and well-identifiable world where patents are traditionally traded and licensed against fees. To put it in another way, these OP licenses create online pools among all the patentees who agree to crosslicense their patents at the same terms and conditions. Therefore, all these licenses arguably raise a "fence" around the safe environments that they define -a fence thanks to which different rules not only govern patents' exploitation inside and outside the "fenced environment", but also affect the process of innovation which will be opened just inside or, at least, just on behalf of those who belong to the pool. Rev. 431, (2015) where it is explained that patent trolls can act against individuals patentees, foundations and big corporations. Yet, the last are their only and actual target because they are the ones who hold the big money. 45 «While these Ground Rules provide guidance and explanation, the Pledge language takes precedence over these Ground Rules in case of any inconsistency». 46 http://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/default/files/docs/ecopatentgroundrules.pdf 47 The Board has a structure and governance. To the Board, for example, the application/pledge forms must be submitted. The board is in charge of sending the diverse notifications and notices accompanying the life on the patent within the commons.
available on a searchable website in order to enable third parties to freely use some of its patents on hardware and software under uniformized terms and conditions. In particular, the agreement states that: «by attempting to exercise any rights granted under this Agreement, Licensee (i.e. who will use Yahoo! patented hardware and software) agrees to be bound by all the terms and conditions set forth below, and subject to those terms and conditions, Licensee may use the intellectual property described below». What is peculiar of this public offer to license is that: (i) third parties accept it by doing nothing more than using Yahoo!'s protected materials; 53 (ii) the uniformized terms and conditions hold for the sole patents that Yahoo!' has chosen to release and not for the many patents that the many firms operating in the same industry (or scientific sector) have opted to bestow; and (iii) these protected materials are available to whoever will use them (even independent researchers), and not only to those that have previously decided to get involved into a specific open project via the granting of their own patents or via entering the project platform. As in the above OP licenses, the Yahoo! license grants a royalty-free, perpetual, worldwide, sublicensable, nonexclusive license to the licensee to make, use, sell, offer for sale, and/or import implementations, i.e. those specific portions of a hardware or software implementation expressly required to be compliant with the Yahoo! specifications. In addition, the license includes a non-assertion pledge and a defensive termination clause.
48 See supra ft 27. 49 See supra ft 29. 50 Indeed, Eco-Patent establishes that, though members are free to withdraw their patents from the "commons" at any time, the non-assertion pledge covering the withdrawn patents survives and remains in force for all patents granted to the commons. 51 «Implementers can make, use, sell, and import infringing machines, manufactures, processes, or compositions of matter under patents on the Patent List without payment of any royalty or similar payments to Patent Pledgers if such infringing items alone, or when included in a product or service, achieve an environmentally beneficial result». 52 The licensing scheme is available at http://domainkeys.sourceforge.net/license/patentlicense1-2.html. 53 Art 3.2 works as a disclosure/attribution clause establishing that «to indicate your assent to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and in order to obtain a license to make, use, sell, offer for sale, and/or import Implementations, You must include, attach or preserve the following prominently displayed statement in the source code and object code of any such Implementations: "This code incorporates intellectual property owned by Yahoo! and licensed pursuant to the Yahoo! DomainKeys Patent License Agreement."».
A similar license, developed within the field of biology though, is the "BioBrick TM Public
Agreement", 54 a free-to-use legal tool allowing individuals, companies, and institutions to make their standardized biological parts be free for third parties to use. In this case, however, the licencewhich is publicly available on a centralized website -is to be used together with a repository of the licensable materials (whether patented or not) which is equally publicly accessible. In particular, the BioBrick™ Public Agreement encompasses two agreements: i.e. the "Contributor Agreement" which is now no longer active. 58 GX's legal infrastructure resulted from the merging of two different sets of tools: the specific ones, which distinguished the GX project, and the general ones that, though tested within the GX community, had been created by CC in order to facilitate the use and trade of any kind of patent, 59 and are still in use. As to the former, GX supplied three different kinds of standardized pledges governing fields of use and royalties; namely: the "standard option", adopted by 2 firms, whereby GX users obtained a royalty-free license for commercial uses;
the "standard plus option", opted by 5 firms, whereby GX users paid for using the patent under specific restrictions; and the "research non-exempt option", chosen by 456 firms, whereby GX users were allowed to research, improve and adapt the licensed patents, and then to patent the improvements for non-commercial uses. Therefore, whereas the standard and standard plus pledges provided a path to commercialize the GX patents, the research non-exempt option sought to tackle the blocking effect that some patents may produce upon follow-on innovation. 60 As to the general legal tools developed by CC and tested within the GX community, they were and still are meant to fulfill an analogous goal: to facilitate research and patent trade via the full disclosure of the available information and the supply of uniformized licensing terms and conditions. Indeed, CC has elaborated three different tools: the "Research Non-Assertion Pledge", the "Model Patent License", and the "License Data Record". The first two are contractual schemes: they are suitable for patent holders who, respectively, are interested in promoting basic research and making a public offer to license their patents on uniformized terms. Indeed, by the Research Non-Assertion Pledge patentees, subject to a defensive termination clause, make a revocable promise not to assert one or more of their patents against any nonprofit institution engaging in a non-commercial research use of them. 61 The Model Patent License, on the other side, consists in a binding public offer, making patents available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to whoever could be interested in using them. 62 The License Data Record, instead, is supposed to be a repository of the main data regarding the patentees and licensees involved in the project using the CC tools. also its improvements which -to be precise -must be shared with whoever support their development. These sharing and pooling activities are carried out through a website where the patent repository and the OP license are available. Whoever is interested in getting one of these technologies may first search the repository and then contact the Bios Initiative Administrator in order to negotiate her entry within the pool, given that the entry will happen according to the uniformized terms and conditions of the Bio-agreements. In practical terms, the entry will entail the signature of a specific "Bios-compatible agreement" according to the kind of "IP and technologies 66 63 In theory, a patent holder who is interested in being involved in the GX projects (or in other Internet-based OP initiatives) fills in the License Data Record available on the web, by specifying whether she wants to change some terms and condition of the default Model Patent License, such as the clauses concerning fees and royalties, fields of use limitations, have made right limitations and so on. Who is interested in such a patent -which, as a consequence, is put out for license together with its terms of use -has only to accept the offer via the website, so to obtain a non-exclusive and non-transferable license to make, use, sell, offer for sale, and import products, services and processes embodying the patent. Whereas some OP licenses establish networks of uniform cross-licenses among patentees with the intent of defending them and their patents from trolls, other OP licenses amount to models -i.e. sets of uniform pledges and covenants -that patentees offer to whomever is interested in using their patents. Therefore, whereas the former OP licenses have a clear defensive function, the latter OP licenses work as non-expensive tools to make innovative processes be more engaging and collective.
Still, what lies at the heart of these two kinds of OP licenses is the non-assertion pledge coupled with a defensive termination clause that creates a reciprocity mechanism between the parties of the agreement. That is very interesting. Traditionally, patents are meant to give their holders the power to use infringement actions against non-authorized uses of their inventions.
Hence, to give up such right becomes revolutionary. It overturns the main patent prerogative by neutralizing the sword that patentees use to protect their inventions. This should create an environment where innovation in general, and collective and follow-on innovation in particular, are easier to achieve notwithstanding patent thicket and trolls. Yet, it must be acknowledged that up to not impose any viral condition). The innovation added by Apple is in the users' interface, where actually Apple does not have competitors.
now the OP licenses that create safe environments are not exploited at most. Indeed, just in a few these licenses do work as spring boards for future innovations by providing covenants, like grant back and viral clauses, that cover technological improvements and follow-on innovation. This means that the potential of the safe environments arising from the non-assertion pledges has not been fully understood yet.
To be honest, there is something else that has not been fully understood and exploited yet.
As the OSS and CC experiences suggest, standardization may have a value. However, their functional equivalent in the patent realm, that is to say, the Non Assertion Pledge and the Model Patent License proposed by Science Commons, have not been usefully employed yet. The reasons for this are many, ranging from a lack of popularity to a need of sector specific terms and conditions that, together with centralized platforms and organizations, could duplicate the successful stories of BioS and BioBrick.
